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Abstract: 
As cultural sociologists have long held, systems of collective meaning invariably take on concrete 
institutionalized form. In as much as a therapeutic code of moral understanding has become a dominant impulse 
in American culture, we would expect to find evidence of this cultural sensibility in society‘s major institutional 
structures, including the criminal justice system. In this article, we consider the impact of the therapeutic ethos 
on criminal adjudication through an examination of the ‗victimization defense strategy‘—an increasingly 
popular legal argument that explains criminal action through a focus on past experiences of social victimization. 
We find that the emergence and application of this legal strategy relies heavily on the therapeutic ethos, a 
development that both reaffirms the validity of the therapeutic culture and potentially transforms the very 
essence of the adjudicative process. 
KEY WORDS: abuse excuse; criminal defense law; therapeutic culture; therapeutic ethos; victimization defense 
strategy. 
 
Article: 
INTRODUCTION 
By now, it is common knowledge that therapy and counseling play an integral role in the criminal justice 
system. Therapy sessions have been integrated into many prison programs (Eisenman, 1994; Germain, 1996; 
Homant,1986) and are required by many community supervision programs as well (Gordon et al., 1995; 
Prendergast et al., 1995). Certainly, this increased reliance on therapy is evidence of the infusion of the 
therapeutic enterprise into the criminal justice arena. However, such overtly therapeutic practices are only one 
example of what is a more expansive development in the criminal justice system. 
 
In other words, criminal law has been influenced not only by the emergence of specific therapeutic programs, 
but by the more widespread penetration of the cultural impulse Philip Rieff (1966) first termed ―the triumph of 
the therapeutic.‖ The increased use of therapy in prisons and supervision programs, therefore, is only the most 
obvious example of the incorporation of therapeutic sensibilities into criminal law. In this article, we consider 
the broader impact of the therapeutic ethos on criminal justice by investigating the recent development and use 
of the ―victimization defense strategy,‖ or ―abuse excuse‖ as it is popularly known (Westervelt, 1998). Before 
turning to the specifics of this new strategy, we first delineate the various features of the therapeutic ethos. 
 
THE THERAPEUTIC ETHOS 
In speaking of the therapeutic ethos we do not simply mean the psychoanalytic tradition within the discipline of 
psychology or specific counseling or treatment enterprises. Instead, we use it here to describe a more wide-
spread cultural system or code of moral understanding. As Berger (1965: 38) notes, ―psychoanalysis has 
become a cultural phenomenon, a way of understanding the nature of man and an ordering of human experience 
on the basis of this understanding.‖ Thus, the therapeutic ethos provides culture with a set of symbols for 
making sense of the modern world. Based on this understanding, the therapeutic perspective has been variously 
described by social scientists and cultural critics as ―the psychological society,‖ ―the therapeutic culture,‖ ―the 
culture of narcissism,‖ ―the shrinking of America,‖ and ―the therapeutic attitude.‖
1
 
 
As depicted in this literature, the therapeutic ethos can be characterized by five defining features, namely, (1) a 
pronounced cultural preoccupation with the individual self, (2) a notable concern with the place of emotions in 
making sense of oneself and one‘s place in the social world, (3) the emergence of a new class of counselors, 
psychologists, and therapists who have been socially recognized as those most qualified to guide the emotion- 
laden self through the complexities of modern social life, (4) the reinterpretation of a growing number of 
behaviors through the pathologically determined heuristic of addiction, disorder, and dysfunction, and (5) the 
unique cultural salience of the language of victimhood.
2
 
 
Regarding the first, one could argue that the ―culture of narcissism,‖ as such, has important historical precedent. 
The peculiarity of American individualism first analyzed in Tocqueville‘s classic critique of American 
democracy and revisited more recently in such works as Bellah et al.‘s Habits of the Heart (1985), has been a 
defining feature of the American experience for a long time. Late 20th-century understandings of the self, 
however, are qualitatively different from the kind of individualism Tocqueville observed in early nineteenth-
century America. More recent conceptions focus on esteeming, actualizing, and realizing the self-evident for 
example in the extraordinary number of books focused on the topic (e.g., the subject of at least 2,421 books in 
print)
3
 and in the popularity of magazines like Self (which was first published in 1979 and now has a total 
circulation of over 1,250,000 readers).
4
 American individualism, in its contemporary form, departs in important 
ways from previous forms of individualism. The self-sufficient, rugged individualist represented in the image of 
the westward driving pioneer of the nineteenth century has been replaced with the more vulnerable, ―authentic,‖ 
inward-looking, and outwardly expressive self of the therapeutic age. 
 
Moreover, the new American individual no longer appeals to the external reference points of once binding 
moral systems and social institutions but to the less restrained and isolated inner recesses of the self. The self 
has become the most culturally salient gauge for making moral judgments and for navigating one‘s way through 
social life. In Daniel Bell‘s (1976: xxi) words, the self has become ―the touchstone of cultural judgment.‖ 
Others have variously described this new understanding of the self as the ―imperial self,‖ the ―saturated self,‖ 
and ―the emotivist self,‖ to name a few.
5
 In short, the self has assumed a more central place in the American 
cultural consciousness.
6
 
 
Closely related to the elevation of the self is the second feature of the therapeutic culture, namely, the dominant 
form of communication and self-understanding known as the ―ethic of emotivism‖ (MacIntyre, 1984). The 
emotivist ethic refers to subjectivized understandings of truth based on emotions rather than reason or logic. It is 
the ―dictum that truth is grasped through sentiment or feeling rather than through rational judgment or abstract 
reasoning‖ (Bell, 1976:72). The emotivist culture encourages a particular ontology, replacing the Cartesian 
maxim, ―I think therefore I am‖ with the emotivist, ―I feel therefore I am.‖ This emotionally-based 
understanding of the self shapes the ways in which individuals participate and communicate in social life. The 
expression of feelings has become the irrefutable trump card, the ultimate appeal that stands impervious to 
charges of logical inconsistency. In the contemporary context, ―All points seem to revolve around the 
individual‘s subjective feelings—whether of frustration, anxiety, stress, fulfillment. The citizen recedes; the 
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 These references can be attributed to the following, in the order noted in the text: Gross (1978), Sykes (1992), Lasch (1978), 
Zilbergeld (1983), and Bellah et al. (1985). 
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See Nolan (1998), Chapter 1, for an expanded discussion of the various features of the therapeutic ethos. 
3
 Books in Print: 1993-4, New York: R.R. Bowker Company, was updated to computer listing of Books in Print on Oct. 11, 1994. 
4
 From a telephone conversation with Anna Lisa Damley in the research department of Self magazine on Oct.14,1994. The total 
circulation for Self in June of 1994 was 1,250,102—724,626 by subscribers and 532,476 off newsstands. 
5
 These terms are offered, respectively, by Charles Sykes (1992), Kenneth Gergen (1991), and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984). In addition, 
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6
 As Philip Rieff puts it, ―The self, improved, is the ultimate concern of modern culture‖ (1966: 62).  
therapeutic self prevails‖ (Elshtain, 1986:92).
7
 This is not to say that all Americans or even a majority of 
Americans appeal primarily to their emotions to determine how they should function within society. It is to say, 
though, that social conditions increasingly militate against other forms of moral referencing and self-
understanding. 
 
The third feature of the therapeutic ethos in American culture is the rise of a new priestly class of psychologists 
and psychiatrists who have been given the social status and cultural authority to make sense of the complex 
emotions emanating from the authoritative self. Replacing the priests, pastors, and rabbis of the old, religiously 
grounded moral order are the psychiatrists and psychologists of the therapeutic ethic. The therapist in the 
contemporary context has assumed ―the role of a ‗secular spiritual guide‖‘ (Rieff,1966:249). 
 
Bernie Zilbergeld (1983), Ellen Herman (1995) and others (Rice, 1996; Lasch,1977) have documented the 
growth of this new ―priestly‖ class revealing the substantial aggregate influence of psychology on contemporary 
society. For example, America has more psychiatrists than anywhere else in the world. In 1983, there were an 
estimated 90,000 licensed psychiatrists in the entire world; a third of whom were in America (Zilbergeld, 
1983).
8
 Between 1965 and 1981, the number of doctorates conferred annually in psychology more than tripled 
while the number conferred in all fields only doubled (Hunter and Ainley,1986). In 1986, there were 133 more 
Ph.D.‘s in psychology than in all the other American social sciences combined. Likewise, in 1993, more 
bachelor degrees were awarded in psychology than in all other social science fields, and in most other natural 
science disciplines as well.
9
 Membership in the American Psychological Association grew from 2,739 in 1940 
to 30,839 in 1970 to over 75,000 in 1993 (Herman, 1995). 
 
That a growing number of individuals need this new form of ―salvation‖ is fostered by the recent increase in the 
number of behaviors viewed within the medical model. Actions that were once interpreted as being good or bad, 
moral or immoral, right or wrong, are now interpreted on the basis of health or sickness. Behaviors once 
understood through a religious frame of reference are now viewed in terms of health, which of course makes 
more essential the role of therapeutic practitioners. In other words, the role of the new priest depends in part on 
the redefinition of human behaviors in pathological rather than moralistic categories. 
 
The fourth defining feature of the therapeutic ethos, then, is the growing tendency to define a range of human 
behaviors as diseases, disorders, or pathologies. Within the therapeutic enterprise, the therapist is, of course, 
concerned with healing or curing the afflicted patient. As the therapeutic perspective has spilled into the culture 
more broadly, so has the belief that a growing number of human actions represent diseases or illnesses that need 
to be healed. ―The psychiatrist,‖ as Christopher Lasch (1977:98) observes, ―has translated ‗everything human‘ 
into ‗mental terms of illness‘.‖ That many Americans have accepted this pathological redefinition of behav- 
ior is evident on several fronts. 
 
One important carrier of this mindset is the popular self-help group format of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). 
Widespread involvement in AA and related treatment modalities has helped to foster the now common view 
that alcoholism and drug use are illnesses that require therapeutic treatment for recovery. A 1987 Gallup poll 
reported, for example, that 90 percent of Americans believe alcoholism is a disease (Peele,1989:46). But AA 
provided only the first step in a longer process of reinterpreting many more behaviors as diseases. Other self-
help groups based on the AA model—such as Alateen (AA for teenagers), NA (Narcotics Anonymous) and PA 
(Parents Anonymous, groups of parents struggling with abusive behavior toward children)— have grown up 
around the country. Also following AA‘s lead are the codependency groups like Codependents Anonymous 
(CoDa), Adult Children of Alcoholics (ACOA), and Al-Anon (for spouses of alcoholics), groups whose 
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members‘ identities are based on their dysfunctional or codependent relationships with alcoholic family 
members.
10
 
 
14Rice (1992) in ―A Disease of One‘s Own‖ makes the important observation that since the mid 1980s the 
disease view has become the predominant understanding of codependent group participants. Rice also observes 
how many of the behaviors of those functioning within the relational universe of alcoholics have been 
reinterpreted in pathological terms. For example, such diagnostic labels as the Hero, the Enabler, the Mascot, 
the Lost Child, the Martyr, and the Scapegoat, are syndrome labels used to describe the symptomatic responses 
of individuals to an alcoholic friend or family member. 
 
Today, self-help groups are available for any number of habitual behaviors. For example, recovery groups have 
grown up for gamblers, overeaters, compulsive shoppers, smokers, those involved in compulsive sexual behav-
iors, and sufferers of agoraphobia (fear of open places) (Rice, 1996). Other self-help groups include Debtors 
Anonymous, Workaholics Anonymous, Dual Disorders Anonymous, Batterers Anonymous, Victims 
Anonymous, and Unwed Parents Anonymous, to name only a few (Sykes, 1992). 
 
In addition to the disease labels of those involved in self-help groups, a number of other behaviors have been 
reinterpreted as illnesses. One indicator of this is the list of disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Third Edition, Revised (DSM 777-R), the mental health classification system published by 
the American Psychiatric Association. The DSM 777-R is ―widely accepted in the United States as the common 
language of mental health clinicians and researchers‖ (DSM 777-R, 1987:xviii). A survey of diagnostic experts 
in 55 countries found that 72% of them used this classification system (Larson, 1988). In the DSM 777-R and 
the more recently published DSM 7V, a whole range of social behaviors have been reclassified in pathological 
terms, among them Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, Pathological Gambling, and Intermittent 
Explosive Disorder (the loss of control of one‘s aggressive impulses resulting in violence).
11
 
 
This, of course, is not to say that everyone is sick or that everyone understands himself or herself to be sick. 
Certainly, some find the pathological reclassifications found in the DSM 7V and elsewhere to be a bit 
excessive. What is important to recognize, however, is that it is increasingly acceptable, on a cultural level, to 
understand oneself and to speak of oneself according to these categories. 
 
Appeals to these reference points are often subtle. Consider, for example, the way in which Americans offer 
pathological interpretations of a range of social behaviors. It is not unusual to hear of someone who is obsessive 
compulsive, or who is in denial, or who has repressed things from the past, suffers from low self-esteem, is 
acting out, has an inferiority complex, is going through a mid-life crisis, or comes from a dysfunctional family. 
As Stanton Peele (1989:54) contends, ―no other nation has taken the implications of disease theories of behavior 
as far as the United States or applied the disease model to as many new areas of behavior.‖  
 
The concern about whether one is happy and healthy now challenges in importance whether one is good or bad 
or even right or wrong. While it is possible that behaviors themselves have changed in some instances, the more 
dominant transformation has been in the cultural definitions of these behaviors. The way Americans view 
alcoholism and other behaviors is a reflection of our cultural values, of the reigning zeitgeist. We are victims of 
our beliefs, just as those in the past are victims of theirs (Fingarette, 1988:15). To call Americans victims of 
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their beliefs is particularly appropriate in the contemporary context where the victim mindset increasingly has 
become part of the way we understand ourselves and our relationships with others.
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The victimized mentality is the final defining feature of the therapeutic ethos and is closely related to the central 
place of the self and the growing cultural proclivity to interpret behavior in pathological terms. The self is not 
the perpetrator of a disorder, but the victim. Implicit in the very definition of a disease is the belief that it is not 
the individual‘s fault, but that someone or something else is to blame. As Stan Katz and Aimee Liu, authors of 
The Codependency Conspiracy (1991), explain, ―The diseased person is cast as a victim of the infectious agent, 
a person who is powerless over his or her disease and has no responsibility for its onset.‖ Just as an AIDS 
patient is a victim of the HIV virus, so too are those within the self-help culture victims of their codependent 
relationships. This, anyway, is how leaders in the movement portray things (see, for example, Beattie, 1987). 
 
This is not to say that most individuals on the level of individual consciousness necessarily think of themselves 
in this way, though the cultural climate may encourage cognitive understandings of oneself to move in this 
direction. Again, the important point here is that the language of victimhood is increasingly visible in American 
culture, which makes appeals to it more likely, in spite of one‘s cognitive disposition. In sum, as Robert Hughes 
(1993:9) observes, ―The all-pervasive claim to victimhood tops off America‘s long-cherished culture of 
therapeutics.‖ 
 
The Cultural Impact of the Therapeutic Ethic 
Thus, the therapeutic ethos—with the pathologies of the victimized, emotivist self-interpreted for us by the 
practitioners of the therapeutic vocations—has become a dominant theme in contemporary American society. 
However, as has been the case historically, prevailing cultural impulses do not remain exclusively within 
culture, but invariably influence society‘s social structures (Schudson, 1989; Berger and Luckmann, 1966; 
Garland, 1990). No less has this been the case with the therapeutic ethos. This ethic has had a significant impact 
upon a number of realms of the American state, including the military (Herman, 1995), education (Kramer, 
1991), welfare policy (Polsky, 1991), civil law and political debate (Nolan, 1998). Here, we focus more 
specifically on its expansion into the legal arena in the form of a new criminal defense strategy, the 
―victimization defense strategy.‖
13
 That is, we look at the way in which a new form of jurisprudential defense is 
being employed in American law and examine the extent to which it relies on the defining characteristics of the 
therapeutic ethos. 
 
Beginning with Emile Durkheim, social scientists have long recognized the important functional and symbolic 
role that crime and punishment play in clarifying the moral boundaries of a given society. Through the process 
of punishment, a particular society‘s moral sentiments are highlighted, underscored, or reclassified. The law, 
then, is of primary significance to society because it establishes, to a great extent, the ―rules‖ by which people 
live and the circumstances under which they will be punished for wrongdoing (as well as defining 
―wrongdoing‖ itself). The criminal law is of particular importance because it represents the community‘s voice 
regarding which behaviors are right and wrong, acceptable and unacceptable, legitimate and illegitimate 
(Dressler, 1987). Stated simply, the law, in particular the criminal law, is ―one way of declaring what is morally 
right and wrong‖ (Macaulay et al., 1995:5). 
 
Thus, changes in legal processes are significant on a number of fronts and can be taken as indicative of larger 
cultural changes in moral understanding. The law, understood in this way, is a window to the particular culture 
within which it finds itself (Geertz, 1983; Glendon, 1987, 1989). As David Garland (1990:21) argues of 
criminal justice practices, ―Punishment ... is necessarily grounded in wider patterns of knowing, feeling, and 
acting, and it depends upon these social roots and supports for its continuing legitimacy and operation.‖ This 
view of law‘s dependency upon culture runs counter to the ―basic bent of orthodox legal scholars‖ who 
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maintain a belief in the relative autonomy of the law (Friedman, 1994:28). We do not wish to argue that the law 
is simply the codified reflection of dominant social forces. Such a crude cultural determinism would be just as 
misguided as a blind belief in the impenetrable autonomy of the law. Rather, we hold that the law is influenced 
by cultural sensibilities just as it, in turn, influences culture. 
 
In other words, culture exists in a dialectical relationship with criminal law. As the culture impacts and gives 
meaning to the law, so the law directs, informs, and instructs culture. ―The broad patterns of cultural meaning 
undoubtedly influence the forms of punishment. But it is also the case that punishments and penal institutions 
help shape the overarching culture.‖ In short, ―it is a two-way process‖ (Garland, 1990:249). This article 
focuses primarily on the first part of the dialectical relationship, that is, on culture‘s influence on law, and in 
particular the influence of the therapeutic ethic on one dimension of American criminal jurisprudence. 
 
Before turning to a fuller consideration of this relationship, it is important to disabuse readers of a common 
misperception regarding the infusion of therapeutic proclivities into American law. It is commonly assumed that 
to be therapeutic in orientation is to be soft on crime. Typical, for example, is the distinction Donald Black 
makes between ―penal‖ and ―therapeutic‖ styles of social control. The former, according to Black, is an 
accusatory style of social control where the goal is punishment, and where the hostile conflict between parties 
results in a clear winner and a clear loser. The therapeutic, in contrast, is a remedial style of social control where 
the goal is social repair and normality, and where the victim gets ―help‖ rather than ―punishment‖ to improve 
his or her condition. According to Black, each style has its own logic, its own language, its own way of defining 
and treating deviant behavior (Black, 1976:4–5). 
 
Though this classificatory scheme may be helpful for certain conceptual exercises, it overlooks the highly 
coercive qualities of some therapeutic forms of social control, a matter given considerable attention over the 
past several decades (Foucault, 1979; Szasz, 1963, 1984; Polsky, 1991; Chriss, 1999). Contemporary 
developments in the criminal justice system like the burgeoning drug court movement, therapeutic communities 
in prisons, and boot camps make readily apparent that the conventional categories of punitive vs. therapeutic, 
conservative vs. liberal, coercive vs. liberating, tough vs. rehabilitative are at best not very helpful (Nolan, 
1998). Represented in these adjudicative and penal practices is the conflation of these conventionally disparate 
tendencies. 
 
Indeed, programs defined as ―therapeutic‖ can have very ―tough‖ consequences. Consider the harshest and most 
punitive of all forms of punishment: the death penalty. Even here, states that had previously abandoned capital 
punishment reinstituted it, in part, because it could be justified in accordance with therapeutic sensibilities. ―The 
offender, who is strapped upon a stretcher trolley like a patient awaiting an operation, is put to death 
anonymously, under the guise of a medical procedure.... The use of ‗therapeutic‘ drugs and medicalized 
procedures is thus an attempt to generate an acceptably ‗modern‘ mode of execution‖ (Garland, 1990:245). 
 
It is not very useful, therefore, to view the ―therapeutic‖ and the ―punitive‖ as mutually exclusive or 
contradictory forms of legal social control. Therapeutic justice can be both punitive and therapeutic at the same 
time. In fact, survey data reveal that in the public mind these two tendencies are not at all incompatible. A 1996 
national survey asked respondents to rank the importance of various approaches to the crime problem. Eighty 
five percent of Americans identified ―more treatment and education‖ as important in solving the crime problem. 
Ranking not far behind, however, were ―harsher sentences‖ (81%) and ―more police‖ (75%).
14
 Americans thus 
are just as enthusiastic about therapeutic treatment as they are more conspicuously ―tough‖ approaches to law 
enforcement. Apparently, these are not viewed as incongruous approaches. 
 
Therapeutic justice, thus, is sometimes mischaracterized by making too wide a distinction between therapeutic 
and punitive forms of social control, and by overlooking the manner in which these two dispositions can 
                                                 
14
 1996 Survey of American Political Culture, University of Virginia. Percentages represent those who answered ―important‖ 
or ―very important‖ to the question.  
function in a rather complementary fashion. Another misconception of therapeutic justice errs in the opposite 
direction. That is, it is sometimes assumed that recent styles of therapeutic justice are not altogether different 
from certain premodern forms of social control. As a consequence, the important novelty of late twentieth 
century therapeutic justice is underemphasized. 
 
Consider, for example, the work of John Sutton who argues that the foundations for therapeutic law can be 
traced as far back as the criminal justice practices of seventeenth century New England. The law had not yet 
progressed along the Weberian continuum toward a more rationalized system of jurisprudence. Judges at that 
time had a great deal of discretion. Available to them were a wide range of sanction options that could be 
variously assigned in response to the individual‘s particular situation. These included wearing a visible sign of 
guilt, for example, a scarlet letter, spending time in the stocks, even ―brandings and mutilations‖ (Sutton, 
1988:70). Importantly, however, judicial discretion was exercised in accordance with ―the degree of repentance 
shown by the offender‖ (Sutton, 1988:70). Given this level of judicial flexibility, Sutton concludes that the 
Puritans had ―developed, in an elementary way, a therapeutic system of justice‖ (Sutton, 1988:70). 
 
But judicial leniency based upon ―repentance‖ and judicial sanctions employing public shamed-based 
punishments are profoundly unlike judicial discretion and forms of punishment (or ―treatment‖) based upon a 
therapeutic worldview. Sutton himself writes that ―the modern notion of rehabilitation is a secularized version 
of the Calvinist view of redemption‖ (Sutton, 1988:64). But this is the critical point. The secularization and 
rationalization processes that characterized the reform movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries made increasingly untenable a Calvinistic interpretation of individual behavior—the system of 
meaning that shaped and defined early American jurisprudence. A contemporary therapeutic lens of 
interpretation may offer the judge or jury greater judicial discretion, but it is based on a system of meaning that 
is fundamentally contrary—indeed, as Rieff and Lasch have persuasively argued, antithetical—to traditional 
religion. In this sense, then, the therapeutic is of a clearly singular quality. Even Sutton recognizes that the 
contemporary therapeutic ethic understands the self in a fundamentally divergent way. He also concedes that 
―such a view of the individual legitimizes highly invasive strategies of manipulation‖ (Sutton, 1988:79). 
 
Therefore, late twentieth century therapeutic justice may be a more pronounced realization of a style of 
jurisprudence the roots of which can be traced as far back as the colonial period. However, the ideological 
contours of the therapeutic ethic, as described by Philip Rieff and others since the 1960‘s, is substantively 
distinct from its ostensible origins. In the Weberian sense, modern rationalism has destroyed its religious roots. 
And though the cultural emergence of the therapeutic in this important social institution may indeed bean effort 
to re-enchant the world, it does not return to the ideals and forms that defined the premodern period. Mandating 
someone to involuntary treatment in order to help build self-esteem or acquitting someone for murder because 
of her victimized condition is qualitatively different from sending someone to the stocks or imposing a more 
lenient sanction because of publicly demonstrated contrition. The phenomenon as depicted here, even if it may 
be the logical end of a process set in motion over two centuries ago, is a fundamentally distinct social reality, 
the substance and consequences of which invite careful description and analysis. 
 
Toward this end, we now turn to an examination of the infusion of the therapeutic ethos into the legal arena, 
focusing on the development of a new criminal defense strategy as an example of the broader process by which 
the therapeutic ethos has begun to inform, influence, and justify American criminal law. As a strategy that was 
first successfully formulated and used in the late 1970‘s and early 1980‘s, the victimization defense strategy is 
uniquely situated to incorporate the defining characteristics of this now dominant cultural perspective. 
 
The Therapeutic Ethos and Criminal Defense Law  
The Victimization Defense Strategy: Definition and Development 
Seizing the national spotlight in January of 1994, the victimization defense strategy was brought to the public‘s 
attention in the Menendez and Bobbitt cases. The first trial of Eric and Lyle Menendez, prosecuted for the 
shooting deaths of their parents, ended in hung juries after defense attorneys argued that both sons were victims 
of physical and sexual abuse and had killed their abusive parents in self-defense.
15
 Lorena Bobbitt was acquitted 
by reason of insanity of the malicious wounding of her abusive husband John after arguing that she too was a 
victim of abuse who had struck back at her abuser while consumed by an ―irresistible impulse.‖ The cases 
shared a common premise: the defendants were not offenders but victims whose actions directly resulted from 
their victimization and should, therefore, be excused. 
 
Alan Dershowitz (1994) labeled this defense argument the ―abuse excuse.‖ In the swirl of attention and 
controversy generated by these cases, many legal scholars and social critics readily offered their opinions as to 
the appropriateness of such a legal strategy (a question beyond the scope of the present analysis). Yet, no 
scholars provided an examination of the structure or development of the strategy or any empirical data on its use 
over time. Such an examination, however, usefully informs debates about the strategy (and, in fact, eventually 
revealed that neither the Menendez nor Bobbitt cases were representative of the typical use of this strategy). It 
also reveals the extent of the influence of the therapeutic ethos on this part of the criminal justice system. 
 
The abuse excuse, or ―victimization defense strategy‖ as it is called here, is a new method of legal argument 
that focuses on repeated past experiences of social victimization to explain and excuse a defendant‘s criminal 
actions .
16
 ―Social victimization‖ refers to instances in which an individual has been injured as a result of social 
relations or conditions, such as in cases of physical abuse, discrimination, social deprivation, and neglect. Thus, 
biologically and psychologically rooted conditions such as premenstrual syndrome, hyperglycemia, and 
schizophrenia are not included as forms of social victimization. The victimization defense strategy, then, is used 
by defendants who seek to reconstruct themselves as victims of abuse, discrimination, or deprivation and use 
that victim status as a way to elicit a favorable judicial disposition.
17
 
 
While the victimization defense strategy is not a new defense in and of itself, it is a new strategy used within the 
context of existing defenses such as insanity and self-defense.
18
 This approach is a new, accepted method of 
argument used by defense attorneys to win acquittals based on insanity, self- defense, or even duress. Consider 
the case of Eloise Shields, a battered woman charged with the murder of her common-law husband (see 
Bochnak, 1981 for a more detailed account of this case). Here, the defense used the strategy to support a self-
defense argument. Shields claimed that she had been physically abused—victimized—by her husband for years, 
including earlier on the night of the homicide. Because of this past social victimization, she believed that she 
was in danger of being abused again and possibly even killed when her partner returned home from his drinking 
binge on the night of the incident. In other words, her actions were the result of a belief that was directly 
produced by past social victimization. Thus, her defense strategy was to argue that she was a victim and that 
this victimization was not her fault. As a result, the actions produced by the victimization (her attack on her 
husband) were also not her fault: she, therefore, should be excused from responsibility for those actions. The 
victimization defense strategy was the approach the defense used to support Shields‘ contention of self-defense. 
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 They actually argued for ―imperfect self-defense,‖ which is not a complete defense. A successful use of this defense does not result 
in a full acquittal of murder charges, but rather a conviction for the lesser charge of manslaughter (Dressler, 1987). Both brothers were 
convicted of first degree murder in their second trial; however, testimony regarding the alleged abuse they suffered was severely 
limited by the judge. Thus, the full defense presented in the first trial was restricted in the second. 
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 See Westervelt (1998) for an in-depth discussion of the definition and structure of this strategy. 
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 Many social critics have noted a similar trend in society in general, i.e., the use of one‘s status as a victim to excuse one from 
responsibility for misconduct or irresponsibility. These critics have labeled this cultural tendency as the ―culture of victimization‖ and 
argue that its entrenchment portends the demise of personal responsibility in America. See Hughes (1993), Kaminer (1995), Steele 
(1990), and Sykes (1992) for this argument. Westervelt (1998) provides a more balanced examination of the relationship between 
victimization (especially within the context of the criminal law) and responsibility. 
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 This is not to say that such an argument has never been used before by defense attorneys.  However, only recently has the 
strategy been methodically formulated into a formal argument that can be used in a variety of cases that share certain features 
and characteristics. Whereas it may have been used randomly in individual cases in the past, it is now one of the primary 
strategies considered in certain types of cases, such as cases of battered women or children  who strike back at their abusers. The 
following are examples of appellate recognition of the appropriate use of the victimization defense strategy in such cases: State v. 
Kelly, 97 N.J.178; 478 A.2d 364 (1984) [battered woman]; State v. Allery,101 Wash.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) [battered woman]; 
Rogers v. State, 616 So.2d 1098 (1993) [battered woman]; State v. Janes,121 Wash.2d 220, 850 P.2d 495 (1993) [battered child]. 
This strategy can be broken down into four main components, again using the Shields case as a point of 
illustration. First, the defense emphasizes social relationships and conditions in a defendant‘s past, rather than 
focusing exclusively on the immediate behavior of a defendant (and others) at the actual time of the crime. 
Second, the defense seeks to establish a pattern of suffering by the defendant and/or abusive behavior endured 
by the defendant over time. This requires the defense to present evidence of past abuse or deprivation. Shields 
incorporated both of these elements into her defense; she sought to introduce testimony about the past behavior 
of her husband, his reputation for violence, and his repeated abuse of her over the years. In several pretrial 
briefs, Shields‘ defense team summarized their reliance on these two components of the strategy as follows: 
 
We have here a situation where the deceased indulged in heavy drinking both in the past and on the night in question, we have here a 
situation where the deceased frequently and repeatedly beat the defendant when under the influence of alcohol, and those beatings 
became more and more frequent and more intense as the relationship evolved. The jury must decide whether or not the defendant 
acted reasonably under the circumstances. Those circumstances are not limited solely to November 26, 1977, but to the totality of the 
circumstances which led up to the slaying of Sidney Watson.... [T]he prior acts of the victim represent a progression of increasing 
violence toward the defendant, and where defendant‘s response on the night in question was based upon the cumulative effect of this 
violence at the hands of the victim.... proof of prior acts of violence by the victim which would naturally create apprehension in the 
defendant is of the utmost relevance (all quotations regarding this case are taken directly from legal memoranda for the Shields case 
cited in Bochnak, 1981:227, 230). 
 
The third component of the defense is the presentation of expert testimony, usually in the form of a 
psychological or psychiatric diagnosis, about the psychological impact of this past victimization on the 
defendant‘s behavior and state of mind. The defendant is often diagnosed as suffering from some syndrome or 
disorder that has directly resulted from the social victimization. In Shields‘ case, she offered expert testimony 
that she suffered from battered woman syndrome as a result of the past abuse. 
 
Finally, the defense actively attempts to reconstruct the identity of the defendant from ―offender‖ to ―victim,‖ 
often explicitly referring to the defendant as a victim. Shields‘ defense team employed this fourth component of 
the strategy when they argued that the testimony about past abuse made it clear ―who was the true assailant and 
who was the true victim,‖ insinuating that Shields was in fact the victim and her husband the true 
offender (Bochnak, 1981:230). 
 
These components place the defendant‘s behavior within the context of her entire life experience, allowing the 
defense to tell the defendant‘s story from her own perspective. For example, Shields recounted a history of 
injustice and suffering, and psychologists and other experts explained how those experiences shaped her 
perspective and behavior. Ultimately, she argued that her actions were borne out of early injustice and suffering 
and should be excused or justified. 
 
In order to examine the initial development and eventual institutionalization of the victimization defense 
strategy, we relied on a number of data sources. Our primary source was state appellate court decisions, while 
we also used secondary source materials, such as law review articles and legal memoranda, to find applicable 
appellate cases and to help us understand the legal arguments in these cases. 
 
For the most part, appellate cases are initiated when the defense disagrees with a procedural ruling issued in the 
original trial and then requests that a higher court review that ruling. We choose to focus on appellate cases, 
rather than trial cases, for a number of reasons. First, appellate cases are available for systematic review. A 
certain number of state decisions are published every year in the regional reporters and are thus more easily 
accessible and suitable for systematic analysis. Trial court decisions are not similarly available for research 
purposes and can only be obtained from the clerks of court of each jurisdiction within each state. 
 
Second, and more importantly, state appellate decisions establish law for that state. Whereas the primary goal of 
trial courts is to establish the facts of a case and determine guilt or innocence, the primary goal of appellate 
courts is to establish law, to determine the rules that structure the activities of the trial courts. Lawyers cite 
appellate cases, not trial cases, to support their arguments; judges base their rulings on previous appellate court 
decisions. If appellate courts rule that the victimization defense strategy is a legitimate way to argue a case of 
self-defense (or duress, or insanity), that acceptance indicates approval of that strategy by the state and deter-
mines that trial courts must also accept the use of that strategy. We, therefore, rely primarily on appellate court 
acceptance as our primary measure of the successful institutionalization of the victimization defense strategy. 
 
When examining appellate cases, we searched for cases in which the defense relied on a strategy that 
incorporated the four components of the victimization defense strategy outlined above: an emphasis on social 
relationships and conditions in the defendant‘s past, evidence establishing a pattern of abuse suffered by the 
defendant over time, expert testimony about the psychological impact of this past social victimization on the 
defendant, and attempts to reconstruct the identity of the defendant into a ―victim.‖ In turn, we coded these 
cases for the following: the legal arguments used by both sides, the final case disposition, the social 
characteristics of the defendant and victim, the type of social victimization claimed by the defendant, and the 
source of that victimization. 
 
The analysis of state appellate cases revealed that the victimization defense strategy was first accepted as a 
legitimate legal strategy in cases resembling that of Eloise Shields—battered women‘s self-defense cases in 
which women argued that their past experiences of domestic abuse explained why they assaulted or killed their 
abusers (usually their husbands or lovers) in self-defense (Bochnak,1981). In such cases, the defense focuses on 
the history of the woman‘s relationship with her abuser, rather than on a description of the events immediately 
surrounding the incident in question. In addition, the defense provides evidence regarding past occasions of 
abuse inflicted on the woman by her abuser, thus presenting the first two elements of the victimization defense 
strategy. Expert psychological testimony, often in the form of testimony about battered woman syndrome, is 
offered to explain how the woman‘s experiences of past victimization shaped her present interpretation of her 
abuser‘s behavior, making her believe that she was in imminent danger of death or serious injury at his hands. 
And, lastly, throughout the trial, the defense reemphasizes that the woman is the true victim in such cases: the 
victim of an abusive spouse or lover, the victim of an ineffective criminal justice system, and/or the victim of an 
inattentive society. Since her actions resulted from this victimization, she should not be held responsible for 
them. Thus, all four elements of the strategy are used to explain why her past victimization should explain and 
justify her present actions. 
 
The first state appellate acceptance of the victimization defense strategy as a new legal strategy came in 1979 in 
Ibn-Tamas v. United States.
19
 Here, the defense had attempted to offer the victimization defense strategy to 
support a self-defense claim by a woman who had killed her abusive spouse. At trial, several elements of the 
victimization defense strategy were not allowed to be presented. On appeal, the court reversed these findings 
and remanded the case back to the trial court for reconsideration of admittance of these elements. This case was 
heard by the appellate court in the District of Columbia. Twenty-three other state courts have heard similar 
cases in which the trial court disallowed elements of the victimization defense strategy in support of a battered 
woman‘s self-defense argument, decisions that were overturned on appeal. In these twenty-three states, the 
appellate courts indicated that trial courts should allow the entire victimization defense strategy to argue a 
battered woman‘s self-defense case.
20
 
 
An additional nine states heard cases in which the victimization defense strategy had been allowed by the trial 
court in battering cases.
21
 These cases were appealed on other grounds, not directly on issues related to the 
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 407 A.2d 626 (1979), reversed and remanded, 455 A.2d 893 (1983), aff‘d. 
20
 The twenty-three states that have accepted the use of the victimization defense strategy  through appellate court decisions 
are: Alabama, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,  Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
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Ga.App.183, 283 S.E.2d 98 (1981); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 
(Penn. 1989); People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1996). 
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 Colorado, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Rhode Island, South Dakota,  and Wyoming. 
 
acceptance of the strategy; however, in each case, the appellate court again indicated its acceptance of the 
strategy. In only five states has the use of the victimization defense strategy in battered women‘s self-defense 
cases been rejected by the appellate courts outright.
22
 Appellate courts in the remaining thirteen states have not 
had to rule on the issue. 
 
We must also add that five states have passed legislative statutes recognizing the premises behind the battered 
woman‘s self-defense argument— Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, and Wyoming. Section 10-916 of 
the Maryland code is emblematic of these statutes: 
 
... when the defendant raises the issue that the defendant was, at the time of the alleged offense, suffering from the Battered Spouse 
Syndrome as a result of the past course of conduct of the individual who is the victim of the crime for which the defendant has been 
charged, the court may admit for the purpose of explaining the defendant‘s motive or state of mind, or both, at the time of the 
commission of the alleged offense: 1) evidence of repeated physical and psychological abuse of the defendant perpetrated by an 
individual who is the victim of a crime for which the defendant has been charged; and 2) expert testimony on the Battered Spouse 
Syndrome. 
 
In addition, California passed a policy by which the Board of Prisons must provide, on a yearly basis, the names 
of women suffering from battered woman‘s syndrome who are currently in prison and who may be recom-
mended for early release. Finally, by 1992 Congress had passed a resolution stating that ―expert testimony 
concerning the nature and effect of domestic violence, including descriptions of the experiences of battered 
women, should be admissible when offered in a state court by a defendant in a criminal case‖ (reported in 
Lefcourt, 1995:18.46). Again, these statutes indicate acceptance of the four components of the victimization 
defense strategy, as used in this type of situation. 
 
Thus, since the late 1970‘s and through the 1980‘s and 1990‘s, state courts have recognized the legitimacy of 
the victimization defense strategy. It has become an institutionalized part of the legal landscape. This is not to 
say that all battered women accused of homicide or assault use this strategy, much less successfully. As is true 
of most cases in our court system, a large percentage of these cases are plea-bargained before ever reaching trial 
or result in conviction after a trial. A recent report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Langan and 
Dawson,1995) reveals that 43% of all spouse murder defendants do plead guilty, with male and female 
defendants equally likely to plea (53% of women, 57% of men). Interestingly, however, of those defendants 
who do choose to go to trial, 27% of the female defendants are acquitted. No male defendants were acquitted. 
Langan and Dawson contend that this higher percentage of acquittals for females is likely due to the fact that 
they are more likely to be acting in self-defense. These women can now avail themselves of a defense strategy 
wholly unavailable to them twenty years ago. 
 
It is also important to note that although accepted most often in the battered woman context, the victimization 
defense strategy has been granted legitimacy by some state appellate courts when used in a variety of other 
types of cases as well (Westervelt, 1998). In fact, the use of the strategy has expanded in two different areas. 
First, this defense approach has been extended to men and children, thus expanding the type of defendant who 
can use it to his or her benefit.
23
 Second, the strategy has now been accepted in cases other than the typical 
―battered spouse‖ case, thus extending to a variety of different types of relationships. Cases involving parents 
and children and siblings have been accepted, as well as cases in which the defendant and victim are merely 
non-intimate acquaintances and even strangers.
24
 Interestingly, in each of these expansion cases, the court 
justifies the application of the strategy on the grounds that it has been accepted by appellate courts in battered 
women‘s cases. Thus, over the past twenty years, the victimization defense strategy has been established as an 
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 Commonwealth v. Kacsmar, 421 Pa.Super. 64, 617 A.2d 725 (1992) [battered man kills abusive brother]; State v. Janes, 121 
Wash.2d 220, 850 P.2d 495 (1993) [battered child kills abusive father]. 
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 Commonwealth v. Kacsmar, 421 Pa.Super. 64, 617 A.2d 725 (1992) [battered man kills abusive brother]; State v. Williams, 787 
S.W.2d 308 (1990) [battered woman kills innocent acquaintance—Missouri]; People v. Romero, 10 Cal.App.4th 1150,13 
Cal.Rptr.2d 332 (1992), rev. granted 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 846 P.2d 702 (1993) [battered woman robs strangers while  under 
duress]. 
accepted legal defense argument, a newly institutionalized and sometimes successful ―story‖ available to 
defendants in the courtroom.
25
 
 
The Therapeutic Ethos as Defense Strategy 
As used in court, this strategy embodies, to a greater or lesser degree, each of the five features previously 
identified as comprising the core of the therapeutic ethos. We will note the links between each below, using 
actual cases as points of illustration. In so doing we will demonstrate that the advent of the victimization 
defense strategy was given meaning and direction by the justificatory presence of the therapeutic culture. The 
therapeutic ethos, then, can be added to the important effect of the women‘s movement to explain the 
emergence of this historically unique legal defense strategy. As the latter has been considered fully elsewhere 
(Westervelt, 1998), we turn now to the concomitant influence of the therapeutic ethos. 
 
First, as discussed earlier, the therapeutic ethos takes the self as the center of moral authority. Less binding are 
externally derived standards against which individual actions are measured and judged. Instead, the self is 
viewed as the ultimate arbiter of values and behavior. The victimization defense strategy also takes the self as 
the primary reference point. The goal of the strategy is to deny the labels placed on the defendant from outside 
sources (labels such as ―offender‖ and ―perpetrator,‖ ―murderer‖ and ―assailant‖) and, instead, to tell the 
defendant‘s story from her own perspective .
26
 The strategy provides information about the life history of the 
defendant, the experiences that have shaped her beliefs and behaviors. The defense contends that the jury cannot 
understand and judge the defendant‘s behavior without first viewing it from the defendant‘s own perspective. 
The defense hopes that the jury will find the defendant‘s actions to be reasonable, or at least excusable, when 
understood from her own point of view, rather than when judged according to some external standard of 
behavior. 
 
Take again, for example, the case of Eloise Shields (Bochnak, 1981). Earlier during the night of the incident, 
Shields‘ husband had been physically abusing her. She argued that this was a common occurrence and was 
often accompanied by threats of further abuse and even death, especially when he had been drinking heavily. 
On the night of the shooting, she claimed that he returned home in a drunken state. Based on his past behavior, 
she feared for her life and knew that her only mechanism for defense, given his greater size and strength, was 
the use of a weapon, resulting in his death.
27
 
 
In order to be acquitted in self-defense, the jury must believe that Shields reasonably believed herself to be in 
imminent danger of serious injury or death and, therefore, used proportional force in defending herself 
(Dressler, 1987). This standard requires that the jury understand Shields‘ ―state of mind‖ at the time of the 
incident and judge her based on her ―personal knowledge of the [husband‘s] pattern of behavior when he in-
dulged in heavy drinking‖ (Bochnak, 1981:228). In other words, the jury must try to understand the defendant‘s 
actions from her own perspective, a perspective shaped by past abusive experiences with her husband. 
 
To some extent, this is an attack on the ―reasonable man standard‖ traditionally applied in self-defense cases. 
According to this traditional adjudicative standard, jurors consider the following: Would a reasonable man of 
average size and strength be justified in using such extreme force in this situation? As such, the basis of 
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 Some legal scholars disagree, arguing that the increased use and success of the ―abuse excuse‖ is a media creation. According to 
these scholars, the strategy is merely a last-ditch effort by defense attorneys and is of no consequence to the legal system. See Bonnie 
(1995), Slade (1994). However, this argument understates the success and significance of this strategy within the legal arena. We 
contend that this is not only an accepted new method for arguing ―abuse‖ cases, but is the primary method of argument. In fact, one 
appellate court reversed the conviction of a battered woman who had killed her abuser on the basis that her trial counsel did not offer 
this strategy in her defense. In essence, the appellate court established, as a matter of law, that the victimization defense strategy was 
the primary method of arguing such cases. See Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (1989). 
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 We use the pronoun ―her‖ throughout the following discussion because the typical defendant using the strategy is a female. This is 
not to deny that several males have used the approach successfully as well. 
27
 Some researchers argue that women are more likely to ―strike back‖ in nonconfrontational situations, such as when the abuser is 
asleep (Bochnak, 1981; Ewing, 1987; Rosen, 1986). However, others disagree, claiming that most battered women kill their abusers 
during an actual confrontation, better approximating the traditional self-defense situation (Maguigan, 1991). 
consideration is a singular standard applied in all self-defense cases that does not take into account the internal 
processes of the ―victim.‖ Implicitly, Shields‘ defense strategy was to question the adequacy of this standard 
when judging her behavior. Was Shields a man of average size and strength who could successfully counter the 
blows of another man? Obviously not, she contended. Thus, this singular criterion was insufficient. Instead, she 
argued that to understand the ―reasonableness‖ of her behavior, one must view the situation from her perspec-
tive. This case reflects a more general trend in which courts are further ―subjectivizing‖ this standard by 
imbuing it with the characteristics of individual defendants (Dressler,1987). As the court states in State v. 
Leidholm,
28
 ―accused‘s actions are to be viewed from the standpoint of a person whose mental and physical 
characteristics are like the accused‘s and who sees what the accused sees and knows what the accused knows‖ 
(quoted in Dressler, 1987:202-203). 
 
Thus, the woman‘s own understanding of her actions becomes the focus of the strategy and trial, not the 
standard imposed by the court.
29
 In this way, the victimization defense strategy emphasizes personal perspective 
over more objectively determined measurements for what constitutes criminal behavior. The ―perspectivalist‖ 
self becomes the most valid source of information. 
 
Closely related to the centrality of the self in the therapeutic ethos is the emphasis on feelings. Within the 
therapeutic culture, expressing one‘s feelings is a cherished value, while denying the legitimacy of someone‘s 
feelings is the ultimate sin. The victimization defense strategy includes this element of the therapeutic ethos as 
well. Reconstructing the identity of the defendant into that of ―victim‖ requires the defense to focus on the 
feelings of the defendant—the pain, shame, embarrassment, and self-doubt experienced by the defendant as a 
result of past social victimization. As one feminist scholar states about the use of the victimization defense 
strategy in battered women‘s cases, the judge and jury must understand the ―accumulated feelings of rage and 
fear that come from being a victim of abuse over a long period of time‖ (Bochnak, 1981:68). The validity of 
these feelings is central to the defendant‘s victim status and can determine whether the judge and jury will view 
the defendant sympathetically. 
 
Thus, Shields, for example, must explain how her husband‘s physical and psychological abuse ―intimidated her 
into fearing for her life [and] .. . created a fear that could not be dispelled or eradicated, a fear which escalated 
over time and which culminated in a life or death situation‖ (Bochnak, 
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 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (1983)—a battered woman self-defense case. 
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 See State v. Wanrow [88 Wash.2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977)] for the first appellate case to recognize the inadequacy of the 
―reasonable man standard‖ for female defendants. Many courts now make reference to a ―reasonable person standard‖ that 
takes into consideration the specific physical traits of the defendant claiming self-defense (Dressler, 1987; Gillespie, 1989). In 
addition, courts recognize that testimony regarding a history of abuse is important  to understand why a woman perceives 
herself to be in imminent danger [Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (1989)]. 
 
1981:228). In State v. Kelly,
30
 another battered woman case that relied on the victimization defense strategy, an 
expert testified that Mrs. Kelly suffered from ―frustration; stress disorders; depression; economic and emotional 
dependence on her husband; ... poor self image; isolation, and learned helplessness.‖ In State v. Hundley,
31
 a 
similar battered woman case, the defense presented the following testimony about battered women like the 
accused: ―the abuse is so severe, for so long a time and threat of bodily harm so constant, it creates a standard 
mental attitude in its victims. Battered women are terror-stricken people whose mental state ... bears a marked 
resemblance to that of a hostage ora prisoner of war .... They live inconstant fear.‖ As one expert testified in 
State v. Janes,
32
 the first battered child case to use the victimization defense strategy successfully, Andrew Janes 
endured ―an unremitting pattern of episodic terror‖ at the hands of his abusive stepfather. To explain, and 
possibly excuse, the defendant‘s actions, the defense focuses on the defendant‘s emotions and state of mind at 
the time of the incident, thus providing legitimacy for the claim of victimization. 
 
A third element of the therapeutic is the increasing importance of psychologists and psychiatrists in American 
society. With socially conferred expert status, these professionals are those deemed best able to understand 
human actions and encourage self-fulfillment in a complex modern world. As psychologists have increased in 
number and influence in our society over the past thirty years, they have also become more accepted and 
influential in the courtroom. Table I above indicates the decades in which the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia first accepted psychologists as expert witnesses. Today, expert testimony by psychologists and 
psychiatrists is commonplace (Kroll-Smith and Jenkins, 1996). 
 
Analysis of the cases when state‘s first accepted the expertise of psychologists reveals that the growing status of 
psychology in America‘s increasingly therapeutic culture served as an important justificatory force behind this 
development. For example, when an Oregon court first allowed a psychologist to testify as an expert witness, it 
did so based upon the rationale that ―clinical psychology has become established and recognized as a profession 
whose members possess special expertise ... ,‖ In this case the court observed that the ―[c]ourts ... have lagged 
in recognizing the expertise of an evolving profession,‖
33
 a condition it sought to remedy by allowing the 
psychologist into the courtroom. Based on similar reasoning, an Illinois court first allowed the expert 
psychologist to occupy the witness stand because of the ―increasing recognition of psychology‘s contributions 
to an understanding of human behavior.‖
34
 
 
                                                 
30
 102 Wash.2d 188, 192, 685 P.2d 564,567 (1984). 
31
 236 Kan. 461, 467, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (1985) 
32
 121 Wash.2d 220, 221, 850 P.2d 495, 496 (1993). 
33
 Sandow u. Weyerhaeuser Co., 449 P.2d 429 (Oregon, 1969). 
34
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In some instances legal recognition of the expertise of the psychologist followed passage of state licensing 
codes for psychologists, which itself is a fairly recent phenomenon. In 1946 Connecticut was the first state to 
pass legislation for the licensing of psychologists. In 1977 Missouri became the fiftieth state to enact such 
legislation. Language contained in these statutes suggests that the legal passage of licensing codes was also 
spurred by psychology‘s elevated status in society generally. This is evident, for example, in Florida‘s law 
regulating psychology, which states: ―The Legislature finds that as society becomes increasingly complex, 
emotional survival is equal in importance to physical survival.‖ Since psychology assists the public ―primarily 
with emotional survival,‖ then ―the practice of psychology‖ should be licensed and regulated by the state.
35
 
 
Subsequently, the role of the psychological expert has become increasingly important in both civil and criminal 
law. This is certainly the case in the legal use of the victimization defense strategy, where expert psychological 
testimony is a primary and necessary component of the overall strategy. Psychologists and psychiatrists are 
essential to explain the ―cumulative effects‖ of past social victimization on the behavior and state of mind of the 
defendant (Walker, 1984; see also Cipparone,1987; Rosen, 1986). These individuals are the recognized experts 
qualified in the science of the mind and, therefore, are best prepared to interpret the impact of past victimization 
on an individual‘s perceptions and beliefs. Thus, psychologists are uniquely situated to explain why, for 
example, a battered woman reasonably perceives herself to be in imminent danger when being confronted by an 
abuser, as again in the case of Eloise Shields. In their argument for the admission of expert psychological 
testimony, Shields‘ attorneys claimed: ―testimony of an expert on the psychological framework of a battered 
woman is essential to the jury‘s determination of the primary issue in this case: that is, did the defendant act 
reasonably under the circumstances which resulted in the death of Sidney Watson?‖ (Bochnak, 1981:231–232). 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Kacsmar,
36
 the first accepted use of the victimization defense strategy in a 
battered male case, the defense argued for a reversal of a trial court decision that had disallowed expert 
psychiatric testimony that Kacsmar was the victim of abuse at the hands of his brother. The defense contended 
that such testimony was essential for the court to understand that the accused ―was the victim of psychological 
and physical abuse inflicted by his brother,‖
37
 and that this abuse shaped his perceptions. The appellate court 
reversed the trial court exclusion, admitted the testimony, and remanded the case for retrial. 
 
Finally, in one remarkable battered woman case, the appellate court actually reprimanded the defendant‘s trial 
counsel for not offering expert psychological testimony at the original trial, stating, ―trial counsel was inef-
fective, and the absence of such expert testimony was prejudicial to appellant.‖
38
 The appellate court overturned 
the trial court‘s conviction based on the use of ineffective counsel by the accused woman and remanded the case 
for retrial, strongly recommending that the new defense counsel make use of expert psychological testimony on 
behalf of his client. As the ―new priestly class‖ of the therapeutic age, the psychologist confers a degree of 
legitimacy on the defense strategy and defendant, explaining that the defendant‘s perceptions and emotions are 
understandable given her past experiences. 
 
As the number of psychologists has grown, so has the American tendency to pathologize or medicalize 
behavior. Just as medical doctors assume expertise over biological dysfunction and interpret behavior within 
that framework, psychologists assume expertise over psychological dysfunction and interpret behavior within 
that framework. It should not be surprising, then, that as psychologists have become increasingly prominent in 
our society, their view of behavior has also gained acceptance. 
 
In many cases, this disease model of social behavior is a primary focus of the victimization defense strategy. 
The expert testimony offered by the psychologists is often, though not always, in the form of a diagnosis. 
Experts explain that because of past social victimization, the defendant suffers from battered woman syndrome, 
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battered child syndrome, urban survival syndrome, or posttraumatic stress disorder (to name just a few).
39
 For 
example, Eloise Shields sought to offer expert testimony that she suffered from battered woman syndrome in 
order to explain why she remained in the abusive relationship and how the past abuse shaped her perceptions. In 
a separate case, a psychologist testified that a young teen killed another youth because she suffered from an 
―urban psychosis,‖ a mental illness that was caused by growing up in a violence-ridden inner city (Flaherty, 
1995; Falk, 1996).
40
 In his self-defense case, Andrew Janes fought for the admission of testimony that he 
suffered from battered child syndrome ... and won .
41
 Such diagnoses place the defendant‘s behavior within the 
disease model: his or her actions are interpreted as resulting from a disorder. As such, the defense argues that 
these actions are thus justifiable. Responsibility should be mitigated or fully suspended. The pathologization of 
behavior, then, often plays a key role in the successful use of the victimization defense strategy. 
 
The tendency to view behavior as a sickness is particularly relevant in regard to a criminal defense strategy 
because of the relationship between the disease model and individual responsibility. Our legal system dictates 
that individuals are held responsible for behavior that is freely chosen, i.e., a result of free will (Dressler, 1987). 
Yet, sickness and disease are states over which people have no control. Therefore, actions resulting from 
disease are attributed to the power of the disease, rather than free will. Some argue that such behavior deserves 
treatment rather than punishment. The individual should not be held accountable for such behaviors that are 
beyond his or her control. Thus, interpreting behavior from within the disease model can directly affect an 
individual‘s level of criminal accountability, as seen by its successful use within the context of this defense ap-
proach. 
 
Finally, and most obviously, the fifth component of the therapeutic ethos—victimization—is central to this 
defense strategy. Each of the elements of the strategy—the focus on past abuse and/or suffering, the use of 
psychologists to explain the impact of the past on the defendant, the pathologization of behavior—emphasizes 
the status of the defendant as a ―victim‖—a victim of a bad relationship or difficult childhood, a victim of 
abuse, a victim of a disorder. The central goal and a primary element of the strategy is to reconstruct the identity 
of the defendant from ―offender‖ to ―victim.‖ Elizabeth Schneider (1986:199) sums up the central goal of the 
use of the victimization defense strategy in battered women‘s self- defense cases as follows: ―... to explain the 
woman‘s action as reasonable. The woman‘s experience as a battered woman and her inability to leave the 
relationship—her victimization—is the context in which that action occurs.‖ As Eloise Shields‘ defense team 
states, it is essential that they establish Shields as a ―victim‖ of abuse and battered woman syndrome and clarify 
for the court ―who was the true assailant and who was the true victim‖ (Bochnak, 1981:230). Similarly, the 
defense and court describe the defendant in Stonehouse
42
 as a ―victim of psychological and physical abuse,‖ and 
Andrew Janes,
43
 the court states, could ―readily be identified as a victim.‖ 
 
By using the victimization defense strategy, the defendant tells a story of victimization, a story which millions 
of Americans are also telling about their own lives (Hughes, 1993; Sykes, 1992). Victimization implies 
innocence and inspires sympathy (Magnet, 1995; Steele, 1990). People are usually the victims of someone or 
something else: they are not the cause of their own victimization. If one is not responsible for the cause of her 
victimization, she is also not responsible for the consequences of it. The victimization defense strategy 
capitalizes on this cultural tendency. By redefining the defendant as a victim, the defense hopes to call into 
question its client‘s culpability. 
 
DISCUSSION 
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 Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (1989) [battered woman syndrome]; State v. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 850 P.2d 495 
(1993) [battered child syndrome]; Milloy (1994) [urban survival syndrome]; State v. Morgan, 536 N.W.2d 425 (1995) [urban 
psychosis and posttraumatic stress disorder]. 
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 See the case of State v. Morgan, 536 N.W.2d 425 (1995). 
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 121 Wash.2d 220, 850 P.2d 495 (1993). 
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 555 A.2d 772, 783 (1989). 
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 State u. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 221, 850 P.2d 495, 496 (1993). 
Thus, the victimization defense strategy fully incorporates the basic features of the therapeutic ethos, providing 
evidence for the infusion of this cultural tendency into one arena of the criminal justice system. Though this 
defense approach is not successful in every case (few, if any, defense strategies are), it has been accepted by 
appellate courts as a new method of arguing certain types of cases, most particularly cases involving battering 
and abuse. In fact, some legal scholars would argue that it is the primary method for arguing these types of 
cases, the first approach considered by defense attorneys. As determined in Commonwealth v. Stonehouse,
44
 a 
defense attorney can now be reprimanded as ―ineffective counsel‖ for his or her failure to employ this strategy 
in battered women‘s self-defense cases. Given this, we contend that the victimization defense strategy has 
successfully appropriated the culturally dominant therapeutic ethos as the basis for a justifiable criminal defense 
strategy. 
 
This is, of course, a highly significant development. The law, particularly the criminal law, both reflects and 
determines community standards regarding acceptable behavior and the conditions under which individuals will 
be held accountable for unacceptable behavior. For example, the criminal law establishes that we hold people 
responsible for misconduct unless they are insane, under duress, or particularly young. These standards apply 
both to criminal defendants and to society at large. To a great extent, these are the rules we use for determining 
responsibility both inside and outside of the courtroom. Changing these ―conditions for responsibility‖ has both 
practical and symbolic importance. 
 
In essence, acceptance of the victimization defense strategy adds ―victimization‖ to the list of conditions that we 
can use to explain and excuse certain behaviors. Victims facing possible legal sanctions can alleviate their 
criminal responsibility by availing themselves of this defense strategy.
45
 In this example, then, the therapeutic 
ethic is used as a tool to challenge, and in some cases excuse, the culpability of a defendant in a criminal case. It 
is used to further subjectify the criminal justice process. By placing the self at the center of the defense, the 
victimization defense strategy asks judges, juries, prosecutors to examine the situation from the unique 
perspective of the defendant, a perspective marred by abuse, by victimization. This defense asks those judging 
the defendant‘s behavior to ―walk a mile in his shoes.‖ When used to support a battered woman‘s self-defense 
argument, this defense approach serves to recognize the woman‘s unique point of view on her actions. 
However, the defense strategy opens the door to the acknowledgment of other perspectives as well. 
 
In other words, [if] the jury must consider the woman‘s perspective when judging her actions ... [then] the jury must also take into 
account the child‘s perspective when judging his actions, or the inner-city youth‘s perspective when judging hers. As a result, the 
subjectification of the law paves the way for the expansion of the strategy to more and more defendants seeking to explain their 
actions from their own points of view... (Westervelt 1998:146). 
 
Thus, when used in this way, the therapeutic ethic provides a way for the criminal justice system to incorporate 
multiple perspectives of victimization into the adjudicatory process. 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that this is the only manner in which the therapeutic sensibility 
informs criminal or civil law. As argued in the first part of the article, therapeutic law can also be used as a 
source of knowledge-power, to borrow Foucault‘s term, that justifies the sometimes coercive application of 
state authority. So which is it? Is it a new justification for state authority or an ideology that excuses individual 
responsibility? We contend that it can be both. Given that the therapeutic ethos is a prevailing cultural 
sensibility, it makes sense that it would be appealed to by all actors in legal conflicts. In many legal disputes, 
this is precisely what occurs. 
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 This should not be interpreted, however, as a wholesale vindication of all victims. Not all  ―victims‖ can use this strategy to 
their benefit: there are limits. For example, the strategy  is most successful when used by people who have suffered 
identifiable physical abuse, and least successful for those suffering more abstract forms of abuse (social deprivation, war -
induced trauma, urban psychosis). See Westervelt (1998).  
Consider, for example, a case in East Lansing, Michigan, where the parents of a third-grade boy sued the school 
district after their son, Jason, was sent to a counselor—over the forceful objections of the father.
46
 This case 
then is a prima facie example of therapeutically inspired coercive action by a state-sponsored institution. 
Interesting, however, were the legal grounds upon which the parents made their case. In Newkirk v. Fink, 
Jason‘s parents allege that ―Jason suffered panic attacks and separation-anxiety disorder as a result of 
psychological tests used in the counseling‖ (Walsh, 1996). Notice that the objections also appeal to therapeutic 
terms, the same idiom upon which the counselor‘s authority is based. Both the victimizer and the victimized, as 
it were, are speaking the same language. They are appealing to the same system of meaning. 
 
That the therapeutic sensibility can be used in both directions in this way challenges sociological assessments of 
the law as commonly understood within Foucaulian and Marxist inspired critiques. The therapeutic may well be 
a dominant ideology, but it is one that cuts both ways. This is not to suggest that the therapeutic is a neutral 
ideological system. The legal adoption of dominant cultural meaning systems are never neutral. They always 
carry with them defining codes of moral understanding that substantively shape and determine legal theory and 
practice. Perhaps the more significant consequence of the penetration of the therapeutic ethos into America‘s 
criminal courts—represented in the adoption of the victimization defense strategy and otherwise—isn‘t so much 
which individual or group profits most from its use, but rather how the very meaning and substance of criminal 
adjudication is transformed in the process. 
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